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makers and market participants. This paper uses high-frequency 
quote and transaction data from the MTS European sovereign bond 
inter-dealer platform to investigate price-order-flow dynamics from 
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informed traders should only execute in low-intensity trading 
environments when they value immediacy over discretion. This 
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1. Introduction 
 
Executing an order is expensive. By aggressing a quote or limit-order the price taker must pay 
the bid-ask spread for immediacy, as well as risk exposing valuable information and moving 
the price in the direction of their trading. In a market like Mercato dei Titoli di Stato (MTS), 
where the liquidity and transactions costs are visible to market participants, other low-visible 
measures of market quality and liquidity are important such as market impact, price trend and 
timing risk. Cheung, de Jong and Rindi (2005) also analyse MTS high-frequency data from 
January 2001 until May 2002. They investigate how trades are absorbed during periods of high- 
and low- intensity trading. Predictions from the literature on the impact of trades conditional 
upon trading intensity is ambiguous. A number of papers argue that informed market 
participants want to trade as much as possible without being detected. Consequently, they trade 
during high-intensity trading periods when liquidity traders are active. This logic implies that 
an unexpected trade during a high-intensity trading period would have a larger impact on price 
(Kyle, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1992). Conversely, short-selling constraints may lead to a 
decrease in the probability of a market maker facing an informed trader trading on negative 
information implying that an unexpected trade during a low-intensity trading period would 
instead have a larger impact on price (Diamond and Verrechia, 1987). Recent theoretical and 
empirical analysis describes the role of order-splitting strategies and distinguishes between 
informed and less informed investors as they seek to optimise trading strategies. Informed 
investors use order-splitting strategies to slow the public revelation of private information to 
increase profits by minimize trading costs. Less informed investors also rely on order-splitting 
to minimize trading costs for hedging and portfolio rebalancing (O’Hara, 2015; Choi, Larsen 
and Seppi, 2019). The specific aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
European sovereign bond markets through a period of crisis to evaluate the price-order-flow 
relationship conditional upon varying levels of trading intensity and to investigate if there is 
evidence of order-splitting.   
 
To investigate this issue empirically an analysis of the price process is needed which requires 
the simultaneous modelling of price and order-flow dynamics, taking trading intensity into 
account. Dufour and Engle (2000) introduce an approach for testing and assessing the role 
played by the waiting time between consecutive transactions in the process of price formation. 
For US stock market data they find that trades had most impact on price during more active 
market periods. Cohen and Shin (2003) conduct a comparable analysis for the US Treasury 
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market. They divide their dataset into days with and without news announcements, and find 
that the effect of trades on returns was higher on announcement days. However, they do not 
explicitly include intraday trading intensity in their analysis. In contrast when intra-daily data 
is incorporated into the analysis, Cheung et al. (2005) report that the impact of a trade in a 
relatively low-trading intensive environment had a larger impact on price than in a relatively 
high-trading intensive environment. This paper contributes to the literature examining price-
order-flow dynamics on European sovereign bond markets. It analyses (MTS) high frequency 
data for French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish government bonds from 
1 July 2005 to 31 December 2011 which captures the impact of the global financial crisis and 
European sovereign debt crisis.  Three distinct periods over our sample period are classified as 
calm, global financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis to examine the effect of trades 
on price. A modified version of the methodology proposed by Dufour and Engle (2000) is used 
to investigate this relationship. We evaluate the interaction between returns and order-flow and 
assess whether trades were better absorbed by market-makers in periods of high- or low-trading 
intensity. We find that for the majority of countries in the majority of periods there was an 
instantaneous upward (downward) price movement following a buy (sell) trade. We also report 
that order-flow had a larger impact on quote revision during relatively low-intensity trading 
periods than in the relatively high-intensity trading periods. This finding supports the short-
selling constraints theory posited by Diamond and Verrechia (1987) which implies that price 
impact on the MTS market can be minimised by splitting large orders into multiple smaller 
orders and dripping them into the market over a longer period, ideally during busier trading 
conditions. Further, we find that order-flows were strongly correlated and the impact of order-
flow on subsequent trades was larger during periods of high-trading intensity.  This implies that 
market participants use order splitting as part of their trading strategy and that there are multiple 
informed traders acting on the same private information.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a detailed explanation of the 
data and how it was constructed; section 3 outlines the methodology employed to model two 
dynamic equations for price changes and signed quantities; section 4 reports the empirical 
results, while section 5 summarizes the key findings from our analysis and suggests an 
important area for further research given recent regulatory changes.   
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2. European sovereign bond market data  
The MTS interdealer platform data covers every transaction for French, German, Greek, Irish, 
Italian, Portuguese and Spanish government bonds being traded on the MTS platform from 1 
July 2005 to 31 December 2011. For each instrument included in the study the limit-order book 
is available in aggregate format with millisecond timestamp. Specifically, the total aggregated 
volumes of the top three price levels of the limit-order book as well as any changes such as new 
quotes and orders, updates, and cancellations. Similarly, trades are recorded with a timestamp 
accurate to one millisecond, and the direction of the trade (buy or sell) is recorded.  
 
For the benchmark liquidity analysis, to give an accurate picture of the market and to avoid 
yield curve effects, we conduct the analysis on the current benchmark instrument for three 
different durations: short, medium, and long. As per Dunne, Moore and Portes (2007), and in 
accordance with industry standard, the short-, medium- and long-term maturity buckets are 
defined as 1 to 3.5 years, 3.5 to 6.5 years and 6.5 to 13.5 years respectively. When selecting 
instruments for the benchmark analysis we select the most recently issued instrument within 
each maturity bucket. The larger economies of France, Germany and Italy have a regular 
issuance of debt at all maturities. Accordingly, we roll the benchmark instruments on the day 
of issuance or the first date where the instrument is available for trading on the MTS platform. 
The smaller economies of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain issue debt less frequently, 
especially during the crisis periods. As such, in some instances the situation arises where it is 
not possible to simply roll to a newly issued benchmark.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Formally, to select the benchmark bond for a given maturity bucket, we use the following 
criteria. For each maturity bucket, starting at 1 July 2005, select the most recently issued 
instrument with maturity fitting into said maturity bucket. This instrument is the benchmark 
instrument until either a) a new instrument is issued that fits into the maturity bucket, or b) the 
current instrument leaves the maturity bucket. In the case of b), we assume that there has not 
been a new instrument issued that fits into the maturity bucket, in which case we select the most 
recently issued instrument in the maturity bucket. If none exists, we wait until a) a new bond is 
issued that fits into the maturity bucket, or b) an existing bond moves into the maturity bucket. 
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It happens for Ireland during the sample period that there is one instance for each short and 
medium benchmark where no bond fits the maturity bucket. It is not possible to calculate 
metrics during these periods. It is not always possible to find benchmark instruments being 
quoted on both EuroMTS and MTS Domestic Markets for the short and medium maturities. 
Consequently, the analysis on the long maturity benchmarks is conducted on the aggregate 
order book across both market segments, and the analysis on the short and medium maturities 
is limited to the MTS Domestic Markets segment only. Table 1 provides an overview of the 
benchmark bonds in the dataset for short, medium and long duration for each country.  
 
Since several significant events took place during our study period, in addition, we divided the 
full sample into three sub-periods:  
• Calm Period (PRE): 1st July 2005 to 14th July 2007.  
• Global Financial Crisis (GFC): 15th July 2007 to 15th January 2009. From July 2007, 
banks in the UK stopped lending to each other due to market fears that counterparts were 
exposed to the emerging US sub-prime crisis. In July, Bear Sterns informed investors that they 
would get little, if any, money back from two hedge funds with large holdings of sub-prime 
mortgages. LIBOR rates spiked. Following a BBC report on the 13th September, Northern 
Rock experienced a bank-run on the 14th. It was subsequently nationalised on 22nd February 
2008.  
• European Sovereign Debt Crisis: 16th January 2009 to 7th May 2010. On 15th January 
2009, the Irish government announced that it would nationalise Anglo Irish Bank. Fall 2009 
Greece’s budget was revised highlighting that the deficit for that year would be significantly 
higher than previously predicted. On 2nd May 2010 the EU endorsed the IMF announced an 
€85bn first European financial rescue plan for Greece. From 8th May 2010 to 31st December 
2011, problems persisted and Greece and a second rescue package was negotiated with Greece 
in 2011. On 28th November 2010 the Trokia (European Commission, European Central Bank 
and International Monetary Fund) agreed an €85bn bailout deal with the Irish Government. On 
5th May 2011, Portugal agreed with the EU and IMF on a €78bn bailout in exchange for an 
austerity programme. Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tomio and Uno (2016) show that for Italian 
sovereign bonds it was not until the start of 2012 that ECB interventions (the Long-Term 
Refinancing Operations: LTRO) diminished the impact of credit risk which suggests it wasn’t 
until this point that the crisis period ended economically.  
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3. Methodology 
 
Price impact is modelled by taking order-flow dynamics and trading intensity into account using the 
VAR model proposed by Dufour and Engle (2000). The model is a system of two dynamic equations. 
One for price changes (returns) and one for signed quantities with lagged values of both variables as 
explanatory variables. This model facilitates the analysis of the interaction between order-flow and 
returns in the form of impulse responses of a shock (an unexpected trade) to the trading process. The 
main advantage of this model is the dynamic setup between order-flow and price return that is important 
because participants on the MTS trading platforms can continuously view live quotes and are able to 
extract information from the live quote updates. Therefore, the process of market making not only 
depends on the concurrent price and trade but also on the previous changes in price and order-flow. 
Lagged traded quantity is also important as the MTS trading system allows the splitting of orders and it 
is likely that the observed order book is the drip quantity instead of the total (block) quantity.  
Following Dufour and Engle (2000), we make the coefficients a function of trading intensity defined 
as the reciprocal of the number of minutes between two trades with coefficients also depending on the 
location of the trade, i.e. whether the trade occurred on EuroMTS or the MTS Domestic Markets. The 
subscript 𝑡 denotes sequential transaction time, either trade or quote update. The model is as follows: 
 𝑟𝑡 = ?̅?𝑟 +∑(?̅?𝑖𝑟 + 𝑧?̅?𝑟ln⁡(𝑇𝑡−𝑖))𝐾𝑖=1 𝑟𝑡−𝑖+∑(?̅?𝑖𝑟 + 𝛿?̅?𝑟𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖𝑟ln⁡(𝑇𝑡−𝑖))𝐾𝑖=0 𝑄𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀1,𝑡  
(1) 
𝑄𝑡 = ?̅?𝑄 +∑(?̅?𝑖𝑄 + 𝑧?̅?𝑄 ln⁡(𝑇𝑡−𝑖))𝐾𝑖=1 𝑟𝑡−𝑖+∑(?̅?𝑖𝑄 + 𝛿?̅?𝑄𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖𝑄ln⁡(𝑇𝑡−𝑖))𝐾𝑖=1 𝑄𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀2,𝑡 
(2) 
where rt = 10,000ln⁡(Pt/Pt−1) is the change in the logarithm of mid-quote prices, Qt is the signed trade 
quantity in millions, Tt is the time in minutes between a trade and the previous trade (0 for quotes), Dt 
is market dummy variable equal to 1 if the trade was on EuroMTS and 0 if it was on the MTS Domestic 
Markets, K is the number of lags. Equation (1) primarily analyses the effect of trades on quote revision, 
while also accounting for lagged returns.  
In the returns equation: 
 
 The 𝛾𝑖𝑟  parameters reflect the interaction between signed trade quantity and return. 
 The 𝛿𝑖𝑟 parameters account for market sector in the interaction between signed trade quantity 
and return. 
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 The 𝜏𝑖𝑟 parameters account for trading intensity in the interaction between signed trade 
quantity and return. 
 
For the quantity equation: 
 The 𝛾𝑖𝑄  parameters account for lagged signed trade quantity. 
 The 𝛿𝑖𝑄 parameters account for market sector. 
 The τiQ parameters account for trading intensity. 
 
The key parameters for discussion are γ̅ir, δ̅ir and τ̅ir. Given the dependent variable is rt =10,000ln⁡(Pt/Pt−1) the implications of the results of the returns regressions are as follows: 
 
 The expected instantaneous price reaction of a one million buy trade on MTS Domestic 
Markets is 𝛾0𝑟  basis points. 
 The expected instantaneous price reaction of a one million buy trade on EuroMTS is 𝛾0𝑟 +𝛿0𝑟 basis points. 
 The expected instantaneous price reaction of a one million buy trade on MTS Domestic 
Markets given a duration 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝜏∗) is given by 𝛾0𝑟 + 𝜏0𝑟𝑙𝑛⁡(𝜏∗).  
 The expected instantaneous price reaction of a one million buy trade on EuroMTS given a 
duration 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝜏∗) is given by 𝛾0𝑟 + 𝛿0𝑟 + 𝜏0𝑟𝑙𝑛⁡(𝜏∗). 
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4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Impact of trading on prices 
 
Table 2 reports the results for the returns model equation 1. The γir parameters, reported in panel A, 
reflect the interaction between signed trade quantity and return. Looking first at the core countries 
(Germany and France) in the calm period, the γ0r  parameter has a positive (0.0393), but insignificant 
coefficient for the German benchmark2. A positive coefficient indicates an instantaneous upward 
(downward) price movement following a buy (sell) trade, which is consistent with Cheung et al. (2005). 
In contrast, the parameter (-0.4819) is negative and statistically significant for France which indicates 
that there was an instantaneous downward (upward) price movement following a buy (sell) trade which 
is at odds with our expectation. During the global financial crisis, the coefficients for both France 
(0.1675) and Germany (0.0287) were positive and significant whereas for the European sovereign debt 
crisis only France had a significant positive coefficient (0.0755), while Germany was insignificant. For 
the semi-core countries (Italy and Spain) during the calm period, the γ0r  parameter is negative for Italy 
(-0.2175) but positive for Spain (0.0109) with both being statistically significant, while both are 
statistically insignificant during global financial crisis. During the European sovereign debt crisis both 
significantly positive with respective coefficients of 0.0466 and 0.1484. Out of the three peripheral 
countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) only Greece experiences a significant positive reaction during 
the calm period. None of the peripheral countries have significant coefficients during the global financial 
crisis. During the European sovereign debt crisis Greece has a significant negative coefficient (-0.1987), 
while Ireland has a significant positive coefficient of 0.7864 which is the largest contemporaneous, or 
lagged, point estimate for all countries.  Lagged values are generally positive across all countries and 
periods, although only a minority are significant. The positive values are consistent with the findings of 
Cheung et al. (2005), and can be attributed to active position building. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 and 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
As above, the expected instantaneous price reaction of a one million buy trade on the domestic platform 
is γ0r  basis points. Additionally, the values for the expected instantaneous price reaction of a five million 
buy trade on MTS Domestic Markets and EuroMTS have been calculated and are reported in Table 4. 
Of the 21 variables reflecting the price reaction on MTS Domestic Markets, there are 15 positive values 
and 6 negative values indicating that on MTS Domestic Markets for the majority of countries in the 
                                                        
 
 
2
 See Antonakakis and Vergos (2013) and Yan, Hamill, Li, Waterworth and Vigne (2018) for justification and analysis of 
countries in our study categorized as being core, periphery or semi-core.  
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majority of periods there was an instantaneous upward (downward) price movement following a buy 
(sell) trade. The δir parameters reported in panel B account for market sector in the interaction between 
signed trade quantity and return. Recall that the dummy variable Dt−i is set equal to 1 for trades on 
EuroMTS, and 0 for trades on MTS Domestic Markets. During the calm period δ0r  is significantly 
positive for France (0.6197) and Spain (0.0150), and also for France (0.0954), Spain (0.1425), Greece 
(0.6112) and Portugal (0.9844) during the sovereign debt crisis. This implies that a trade on the 
EuroMTS had a significantly larger instantaneous impact on price relative to the same trade on MTS 
Domestic Markets. In contrast it is significantly less for Germany (-0.0343) during the Global Financial 
Crisis, and also for Greece (-0.0109) and Ireland (-0.0311) during calm periods which implies a lower 
instantaneous impact on price relative to the same trade on the MTS domestic market. These results 
should be viewed in context with Figure 1, which shows that there was a marked decrease in the number 
of trades on EuroMTS compared to MTS Domestic Markets during the European sovereign debt crisis.  
Taken together these results highlight variation in the magnitude of coefficient estimates across 
countries with some significant negative values indicating structural differences in how markets absorb 
trades which provides guidance for further country specific research. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The τir parameters account for trading intensity in the interaction between signed trade quantity and 
return. During the global financial crisis, the τ0r  parameter is significantly positive for Germany (0.0120), 
France (0.0680), and Portugal (0.0062). Likewise, it is significant for Italy (0.0888) and Ireland (0.0049) 
during the calm period, and also European sovereign debt crisis for Germany (0.0233), Italy (0.0096) 
and Greece (0.3449). Positive values imply that the larger the quantity being traded the larger the 
instantaneous price reaction, and that the reaction was strongest when trading intensity was low. 
Knowledge of the impact that trade execution has on price is particularly relevant for informed traders 
who are trying to minimise the price impact of trading, as they may want to minimise price impact in 
order to conceal privileged information. The logic of using order-splitting to minimise price impact to 
increase profits for informed investors and minimise trading costs for less informed investors such as 
index mutual funds and relatively more passive pension and insurance companies, underpins the model 
of Choi et al. (2019). This result implies that price impact on the MTS market can be minimised by 
splitting large orders into multiple smaller orders and dripping them into the market over a longer period. 
This strategy would however expose market participants to the risk of an adverse price movement. They 
may prefer to execute the whole volume in one order at the best price regardless of the resulting price 
impact. This result is consistent with Cheung et al. (2005) who also find that the impact of a trade in a 
relatively low intensity trading environment had a larger impact on price for the MTS market in 2001-
02. However, it differs to the finding of Dufour and Engle (2000) in their analysis of stock markets.  
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4.2. Quantity equation 
 
Table 4 reports the results for the quantity equation regression. The γir parameters, panel A, account for 
lagged signed trade quantity. The γ1Q parameters in the first column of results are positive and 
statistically significant for all countries for all periods. This indicates that a buy (sell) trade was likely 
to be followed by a buy (sell) trade. The lagged values of γiQ in the second column of data are similarly 
positive and significant in all instances except for γ2Q⁡Ireland in the pre-crisis calm period.  Order 
splitting to minimise price impact is one potential reason for the finding that trades are likely followed 
by trades in the same direction. This is consistent with the discussion of the τ0r  parameter results in the 
previous section. Executing large orders has a larger impact on price; market participants can minimise 
this impact by splitting large orders into smaller orders and dripping them into the market in the hope of 
preserving privileged information. Another potential reason is that when private events happen the 
privileged information becomes available to multiple market participants and they act on it within a 
short time frame until the opportunity no longer exists. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The δir parameters account for market sector. This effect was strongest on MTS Domestic Markets 
for Germany where the δ1Q parameters are negative and significant across all periods. This implies that 
lagged trades on EuroMTS had a smaller instantaneous impact on current trades relative to the same 
trade on MTS Domestic Markets. During the calm period, the δ1Q parameters are negative for France 
and Portugal, but only statistically significant for Portugal. It is positive for the remaining four countries. 
During the global financial crisis, the δ1Q parameters are negative for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, 
positive for Italy, France and Spain. All are statistically significant. During the European sovereign debt 
crisis, the δ1Q parameters are positive and significant for all countries other than Germany. This implies 
that lagged trades on EuroMTS had a larger instantaneous impact on current trades relative to the same 
trade on MTS Domestic Markets. There is no consistent pattern across the additional lagged variables, 
implying there was not one market segment that increased this effect. The τir parameters account for 
trading intensity. The τ1r  parameters, panel C first column of results, are significantly negative for all 
countries for all periods except Germany during the global financial crisis, which is insignificant, and 
Portugal during the European sovereign debt crisis which is positive and significant (0.0027). Taken in 
context with the generally positive δ1Q parameters, the likelihood that a trade was followed by a trade of 
the same direction decreased as the time between the trades increased. Again, this is consistent with the 
practice of order splitting and multiple informed traders acting on the same private information.   
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Overall, this paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis for European sovereign bonds markets. 
While we argue that on balance a number of findings emerge there is also some heterogeneity in our 
results at the individual country levels. For example, in section 2.1. we highlight that in the returns 
equation there is an anomalous significant negative coefficient on the γir parameter for France. We hope 
this will motivate further analysis at the country level. Also, while our findings are consistent with 
Cheung et al. (2005) for European sovereign bond markets they contrast with equity markets. Given the 
theoretical model of Choi et al. (2019) there is scope for additional research in this area given the dearth 
of theoretical and empirical analysis.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper uses high-frequency quote and transaction data from the MTS European sovereign bond 
inter-dealer platform to investigate the price-order-flow dynamics from July 2005 to December 2011 
for Germany, France, Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Spain, Greece. We find that order-flow had a larger 
impact on quote revision in a relatively low-intensity trading environment than in a relatively high 
intensity trading environment implying that informed traders should only execute in low-intensity 
trading environments when they value immediacy over discretion. Further, we find that order-flows 
were strongly correlated, and the impact of order-flow on subsequent trades was larger during periods 
of high trading intensity. Taken together with the first main result, we conclude that market participants 
on the MTS market use order-splitting as part of their trading strategy to minimise price impact, and that 
there are multiple informed traders acting on the same private information. To our knowledge Cheung 
et al. (2005) is the only other paper to provide a comparable analysis for the European sovereign bond 
market. Their dataset encompasses Italian, French, German and Belgian government bonds traded on 
MTS from January 2001 until May 2002. They report that the impact of a trade in a relatively low trading 
intensity environment has a larger impact on price than in a relatively high intensity environment. Our 
analysis shows that this result holds during the global financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis.       
 
There is significant scope to extend this analysis to inform policy. European capital markets were subject 
to updated Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) and the accompanying Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) from 3rd January 2018 that regulates both investment firms 
and trading venues. An obvious extension of this paper would be to repeat our analysis to make use of 
quasi-experimental research design to assess the impact of these regulatory innovations.  
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Table 1. European sovereign benchmark bonds 
Country 
(market) 
Type Ticker Maturity Number of 
bonds 
Avg 
duration 
(yrs) 
Avg 
coupon 
(%) 
Avg daily 
quote vol 
(million €) 
Avg daily 
number of 
trades  
(abs num) 
France BTA BTNS Short 8 2.4 2.4 203 1.4 
(FRF) BTA BTNS Medium 23 5.4 3.4 186 1.2 
 OAT FRTR Long 30 10.6 4.7 363 2.6 
Germany DEM BKO Short 28 2.0 2.2 133 0.5 
 (GEM) DEM OBL Medium 26 5.6 3.25 134 0.4 
  DEM DBR Long 39 10.1 4.25 290 2.0 
Italy BTP BTPS Short 22 3.0 3.2 221 14.6 
(MTS) BTP BTPS Medium 21 5.1 3.8 208 13.9 
 BTP BTPS Long 29 10.3 5.3 360 29.6 
Greece GGB GGB Short 6 3.3 3.1 95 1.1 
(GGB) GGB GGB Medium 9 5.3 4.3 118 1.2 
 GGB GGB Long 16 9.9 5.6 190 4.4 
Ireland IRL IRISH Short 2 3.0 4.0 81 0.4 
(IRL) IRL IRISH Medium 3 5.6 3.8 63 0.5 
 IRL IRISH Long 5 10.9 5.0 149 0.7 
Portugal PTE PGB Short 3 3.3 3.0 139 2.9 
(PTE) PTE PGB Medium 6 5.1 4.4 139 2.0 
 PTE PGB Long 14 10.3 5.1 263 3.6 
Spain BON SPGB Short 6 3.1 3.0 170 1.6 
(ESP) BON SPGB Medium 12 5.1 3.7 168 1.9 
 
OBE SPGB Long 20 10.3 5.3 302 4.4 
Notes: This table contains reference information for the benchmark instruments of the seven 
countries included in the analysis. The first column details the country and the MTS Domestic 
Markets identifier. The second and third columns detail two important MTS market identifiers: 
the bond type and ticker, respectively. The maturity column details whether the bond type is 
short-, medium- or long-term, defined as 1 to 3.5 years, 3.5 to 6.5 years and 6.5 to 13.5 years 
respectively. Descriptice statistics include the number of bonds per category, the average 
duration in years, the average coupon in percentage of par, the average daily quote volume in 
millions of euro, and the average daily nunber of trades in absolute number. 
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Table 2. Returns equation 
Panel A: Returns equation: signed trade quantities, and market and signed trade quantities 
  Signed trade quantities  Market and signed trade quantities 
    γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3  δ0 δ1 δ2 δ3 
Germany Calm 0.0393  0.0150  0.0150  0.0107   0.0019  -0.4292  -0.0035  0.0035  
  
  [0.82] [0.31] [0.31] [0.33]  [0.04] [-8.95] [-0.07] [0.07] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0287  0.0338  0.0112  0.0181   -0.0343  -0.0175  -0.0001  -0.0022  
  
  [3.08] [3.62] [1.2] [3.12]  [-3.68] [-1.87] [-0.01] [-0.23] 
  
Euro sov. debt 0.0228  0.0093  0.0134  0.0095   0.0026  -0.0123  -0.0444  -0.0012  
  
  [0.9] [0.36] [0.52] [0.61]  [0.06] [-0.28] [-1.02] [-0.03] 
France Calm -0.4819  0.5488  0.0284  -0.0351   0.6197  1.0458  -0.3467  0.0277  
  
  [-3.27] [3.71] [0.19] [-0.33]  [3.52] [5.94] [-1.97] [0.16] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.1675  - -0.0266  0.0005   -0.1650  0.9144  -0.0468  -0.1045  
  
  [2.47] [-3.12] [-0.39] [0.01]  [-1.8] [9.98] [-0.51] [-1.15] 
  
Euro sov. debt 0.0755  0.0110  0.0036  0.0157   0.0954  0.0556  0.0373  0.0145  
  
  [6.38] [0.92] [0.3] [2.3]  [3.19] [1.85] [1.24] [0.48] 
Italy Calm -0.2175  0.0223  -0.0065  0.0099   0.0899  0.0256  0.0086  -0.0996  
  
  [-4.96] [0.51] [-0.15] [0.33]  [1.24] [0.35] [0.12] [-1.37] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0115  0.0206  0.0423  0.0154   -0.0027  -0.0145  -0.0166  -0.0041  
  
  [0.44] [0.78] [1.61] [0.9]  [-0.06] [-0.30] [-0.34] [-0.09] 
  
Euro sov. debt 0.0466  0.0558  0.0260  0.0358   0.0053  0.0218  -0.0025  -0.0006  
  
  [11.01] [13.12] [6.09] [15.22]  [0.37] [1.50] [-0.17] [-0.04] 
Spain Calm 0.0109  - -0.0019  -0.0040   0.0150  0.0049  0.0078  0.0018  
  
  [3.07] [-1.50] [-0.52] [-2.05]  [2.83] [0.93] [1.47] [0.33] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0022  0.0001  0.0031  0.0071   0.0174  0.0094  0.0018  0.0024  
  
  [-0.09] [0.01] [0.13] [0.51]  [0.48] [0.26] [0.05] [0.07] 
  
Euro sov. debt 0.1484  0.0227  0.0356  0.0283   0.1425  0.1106  0.0377  0.0875  
  
  [5.09] [0.78] [1.21] [1.96]  [2.01] [1.56] [0.53] [1.24] 
Greece Calm 0.0377  0.0139  0.0074  0.0026   -0.0109  -0.0069  -0.0025  -0.0016  
  
  [9.85] [3.61] [1.91] [1.32]  [-2.6] [-1.64] [-0.6] [-0.38] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0509  0.0353  -0.0009  0.0103   0.0056  -0.0154  -0.0071  0.0022  
  
  [0.98] [0.68] [-0.02] [0.38]  [0.09] [-0.26] [-0.12] [0.04] 
  
Euro sov. debt -0.1987  0.0935  0.0676  0.0706   0.6112  -0.3295  -0.1367  0.0182  
  
  [-2.39] [1.12] [0.8] [1.39]  [3.72] [-2.01] [-0.83] [0.11] 
Ireland Calm 0.0126  0.0020  0.0119  0.0090   -0.0311  -0.0103  -0.0018  0.0024  
  
  [1.25] [0.2] [1.15] [1.41] 
 [-3.13] [-1.02] [-0.18] [0.24] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0187  0.0038  0.0514  0.0668   -0.0738  0.0285  -0.0237  -0.0272  
  
  [0.2] [0.04] [0.54] [0.97]  [-0.74] [0.28] [-0.24] [-0.27] 
  
Euro sov. debt 0.7864  0.0806  0.4543  0.2437   0.0907  0.0919  0.1245  -0.1722  
  
  [1.97] [0.2] [1.09] [1.27]  [0.16] [0.17] [0.22] [-0.31] 
Portugal Calm 0.0074  0.0026  0.0026  0.0002   -0.0032  -0.0022  -0.0055  -0.0090  
  
  [0.66] [0.23] [0.23] [0.03]  [-0.16] [-0.11] [-0.28] [-0.45] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0051  0.0150  0.0025  0.0079   0.0030  -0.0035  0.0026  -0.0017  
  
  [-1.08] [3.17] [0.52] [2.56]  [0.47] [-0.55] [0.41] [-0.27] 
  
Euro sov. debt -0.0290  0.0024  -0.0080  0.0628   0.9844  0.4126  -0.0248  -0.0857  
  
  [-0.18] [0.01] [-0.05] [0.72] 
 [2.58] [1.08] [-0.06] [-0.22] 
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Panel B: Returns equation: returns, and intensity and returns 
 
 
  
  Returns  Intensity and returns 
    β1 β2 β3  z1 z2 z3 
Germany Calm -0.0014  0.0002  -0.0001   0.9227  -0.0066  -0.0047  
  
  [-0.62] [0.09] [-0.06] 
 [39.34] [-0.28] [-0.21] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.3243  0.1266  -0.1351   0.0051  0.0249  -0.0197  
  
  [-197.93] [73.96] [-82.43]  [1.43] [6.91] [-5.55] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.3136  -0.1655  -0.1282   0.0411  0.0230  0.0232  
  
  [-248.6] [-126.7] [-101.61]  [6.05] [3.38] [3.5] 
France Calm 0.1582  -0.0251  0.0037   -0.2311  0.0381  -0.0049  
  
  [69.29] [-10.86] [1.62]  [-21.87] [3.6] [-0.47] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0240  0.0029  -0.0024   0.0057  -0.0007  0.0006  
  
  [-13.36] [1.63] [-1.34]  [5.3] [-0.68] [0.51] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.0409  0.0375  0.0192   -0.0552  -0.0072  -0.0086  
  
  [32.95] [30.19] [15.51]  [-14.51] [-1.89] [-2.27] 
Italy Calm -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0001   -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0000  
  
  [-0.03] [-0.09] [-0.04]  [-0.04] [-0.03] [0.02] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0048  -0.3555  -0.0040   0.0011  0.0826  0.0009  
  
  [-2.84] [-227.19] [-2.41]  [0.99] [74.55] [0.78] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.1861  -0.0806  -0.0765   -0.0758  -0.0134  -0.0361  
  
  [-122.59] [-52.43] [-51.27]  [-75.6] [-13.24] [-35.87] 
Spain Calm -0.0090  0.0053  -0.0082   0.0073  0.0007  0.0164  
  
  [-4.17] [2.48] [-3.82]  [2.69] [0.26] [6.13] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0140  0.0130  -0.0122   0.0294  -0.0103  -0.0213  
  
  [-8.89] [8.29] [-7.77]  [1.47] [-0.51] [-1.08] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0495  -0.0516  0.0536   -0.0494  -0.0243  -0.0194  
  
  [-36.29] [-37.81] [39.3]  [-23.58] [-11.62] [-9.24] 
Greece Calm -0.0308  0.0098  -0.0054   0.0047  -0.0004  -0.0043  
  
  [-14.15] [4.49] [-2.46]  [1.5] [-0.13] [-1.39] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0049  -0.0026  -0.0059   -0.0288  -0.0137  -0.0066  
  
  [-2.79] [-1.46] [-3.36]  [-2.02] [-0.96] [-0.47] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.1993  -0.0415  -0.0667   0.0130  0.0099  0.0052  
  
  [-107.56] [-21.99] [-36.01]  [12.06] [9.18] [4.84] 
Ireland Calm -0.0329  0.0048  0.0015   0.0080  0.0240  -0.0227  
  
  [-13.21] [1.92] [0.6]  [0.94] [2.85] [-2.74] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.7067  -0.4570  -0.2279   0.0798  0.0056  -0.0008  
  
  [-410.81] [-232.4] [-132.5]  [5.7] [0.4] [-0.05] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0657  0.0071  -0.0225   -0.0376  -0.0051  -0.0299  
  
  [-42.21] [4.55] [-14.47]  [-6.46] [-0.87] [-5.14] 
Portugal Calm 0.0008  -0.0015  -0.0007   0.0099  0.0041  0.0075  
  
  [0.35] [-0.67] [-0.3]  [0.62] [0.26] [0.47] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.2216  0.1823  -0.1538   0.0371  -0.0305  0.0221  
  
  [-129.63] [105.78] [-89.86]  [13.52] [-11.13] [8.09] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0169  -0.0306  -0.0016   -0.0126  -0.0012  0.0054  
  
  [-11.48] [-20.79] [-1.08]  [-1.97] [-0.18] [0.84] 
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Panel C: Returns equation: intensity and signed trade quantities, and intercept 
  Intensity and signed trade quantities  Intercept 
    τ0 τ1 τ2 τ3  α 
Germany Calm 0.0122  0.0430  0.0001  -0.0475   -0.0183  
  
  [1.16] [3.94] [0.01] [-0.48]  [-0.9] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0120  0.0065  -0.0026  -0.0006   0.0080  
  
  [5.77] [3.11] [-1.25] [-0.04]  [2.72] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.0233  0.0127  0.0041  0.0050   0.0063  
  
  [4.10] [2.17] [0.71] [0.19]  [1.52] 
France Calm 0.0574  -0.2831  -0.0200  0.0282   -0.2727  
  
  [1.52] [-7.49] [-0.53] [0.10]  [-3.54] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0680  0.0661  0.0053  -0.0004   -0.0710  
  
  [3.98] [3.87] [0.31] [0.00]  [-2.26] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.0042  0.0143  0.0055  -0.0034   0.0022  
  
  [1.48] [5.06] [1.94] [-0.16]  [0.5] 
Italy Calm 0.0888  -0.0094  0.0068  0.0388   -0.4108  
  
  [4.93] [-0.52] [0.38] [0.51]  [-4.96] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0005  0.0039  -0.0085  -0.0204   -0.0358  
  
  [-0.05] [0.42] [-0.91] [-0.42]  [-1.26] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.0096  0.0104  0.0066  -0.0230   0.0017  
  
  [6.36] [6.86] [4.37] [-2.66]  [0.33] 
Spain Calm 0.0077  0.0028  0.0002  0.0083   -0.0022  
  
  [8.17] [2.89] [0.16] [1.24]  [-1.00] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0053  0.0021  0.0010  -0.0029   -0.0081  
  
  [0.85] [0.33] [0.15] [-0.08]  [-0.69] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.0004  0.0153  0.0071  -0.0115   -0.0051  
  
  [0.05] [2.12] [0.99] [-0.22]  [-0.34] 
Greece Calm 0.0019  -0.0002  -0.0015  0.0011   -0.0027  
  
  [1.86] [-0.19] [-1.52] [0.17]  [-1.10] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0078  0.0067  0.0038  -0.0113   0.0231  
  
  [0.55] [0.47] [0.26] [-0.15]  [1.08] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.3449  0.0566  0.0017  -0.1545   -0.0275  
  
  [12.73] [2.08] [0.06] [-0.83]  [-0.94] 
Ireland Calm 0.0049  0.0014  -0.0012  -0.0175   -0.0037  
  
  [2.68] [0.74] [-0.64] [-0.89]  [-1.35] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0230  0.0071  0.0058  -0.0146   0.0058  
  
  [1.11] [0.34] [0.28] [-0.17]  [0.24] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.0287  0.0670  -0.0721  -0.0411   -0.0669  
  
  [0.41] [0.97] [-1.01] [-0.05]  [-1.47] 
Portugal Calm 0.0031  0.0003  -0.0003  0.0100   0.0169  
  
  [1.03] [0.08] [-0.09] [0.59]  [1.55] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0062  0.0001  0.0010  -0.0108   0.0043  
  
  [4.85] [0.10] [0.75] [-1.48]  [1.32] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.0435  0.0346  0.0287  -0.0166   -0.0429  
  
  [1.23] [0.98] [0.81] [-0.07]  [-0.73] 
Notes: The table displays coefficients and T-statistics for the returns equation. 
T-statistics are shown in parentheses below the coefficient values. The 
dependent variable ⁡rt = 10,000⁡ln⁡(Pt/Pt−1) is the change in the natural 
logarithm of the quoted prices;  Tt is the time interval between two 
consecutive trades in seconds; Qt is the signed trade quantity in millions; Dt 
is a dummy variable for the market indicator where 1 indicates a trade on the 
EuroMTS platform. Equation: rt = α̅r +∑ (β̅ir + z̅irln⁡(Tt−i))𝐾i=1 rt−i +∑ (γ̅ir + δ̅irDt−i + τ̅irln⁡(Tt−i))𝐾i=0 Qt−i + ε1,t, lags are truncated at K=3 in the 
estimation. 
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Figure 1. Monthly transactions, long benchmarks 
Panel A: Time series charts 
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Panel B: Means and mean differences for the number of transactions 
Country Variable Calm Global fin. crisis Euro sov. debt crisis 
Germany Mean 87.7 56.4 37.8 
 t-stat 
 2.557 2.033 
 p-value 
 0.007 0.024 
France Mean 63.6 75.5 90.2 
 t-stat 
 -0.530 -0.610 
 p-value 
 0.299 0.272 
Italy Mean 1,068.1 754.5 897.0 
 t-stat 
 3.711 -1.429 
 p-value 
 <0.001 0.079 
Spain Mean 131.3 107.2 165.4 
 t-stat 
 0.884 -2.019 
 p-value 
 0.190 0.024 
Greece Mean 172.5 174.0 41.1 
 t-stat 
 -0.058 5.095 
 p-value 
 0.477 <0.001 
Ireland Mean 19.2 27.7 11.3 
 t-stat 
 -1.283 2.672 
 p-value 
 0.103 0.005 
Portugal Mean 159.1 135.4 27.6 
 t-stat 
 0.795 3.857 
 p-value 
 0.215 <0.001 
Notes: In Panel A the graphs display monthly number of transactions and 
average transaction size for the long benchmark instruments. Light blue 
indicates the transactions on the MTS Domestic Markets segment, dark blue 
the EuroMTS segment. Panel B displays the mean number of transactions for 
each of the three periods, and the mean differences between the number of 
transactions in the first and second, and second and third periods. The panel 
displays coefficients, t-statistics and P-values; bold indicates significant at 
the 5% level. 
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Table 3. Impact of a trade on the quoted price 
  MTS Domestic 
Markets 
EuroMTS 
Germany Calm 0.197  0.206  
 
Glob fin. crisis 0.143  -0.028  
 
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.114  0.127  
France Calm -2.409  0.689  
 
Glob fin. crisis 0.838  0.012  
 
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.377  0.854  
Italy Calm -1.088  -0.638  
 
Glob fin. crisis 0.057  0.044  
 
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.233  0.260  
Spain Calm 0.054  0.129  
 
Glob fin. crisis -0.011  0.076  
 
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.742  1.455  
Greece Calm 0.189  0.134  
 
Glob fin. crisis 0.254  0.283  
 
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.994  2.062  
Ireland Calm 0.063  -0.093  
 
Glob fin. crisis 0.094  -0.275  
 
Euro sov. debt crisis 3.932  4.385  
Portugal Calm 0.037  0.021  
 
Glob fin. crisis -0.025  -0.011  
 
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.145  4.777  
Notes: This table displays the estimated impact, in basis points, on the quoted 
price following a five million euro trade. 
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Table 4. Quantities equation 
Panel A: Quantities equation: trade quantity, and market and trade quantity 
    Lagged trade quantities   Market and lagged trade quantities 
    γ1 γ2 γ3   δ1 δ2 δ3 
Germany Calm 0.1419  0.0284  0.0276    -0.0527  0.0084  -0.0138  
  
  [31.18] [6.15] [8.94]   [-11.62] [1.86] [-3.06] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0753  0.0739  0.0264    -0.0328  -0.0012  -0.0096  
  
  [21.83] [21.31] [12.26]   [-9.45] [-0.36] [-2.75] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.1891  0.1178  0.0377    -0.0215  -0.0045  0.0173  
  
  [80.62] [49.77] [26.28]   [-5.37] [-1.12] [4.34] 
France Calm 0.1266  0.0897  0.0637    -0.0058  -0.0249  -0.0415  
  
  [32.72] [22.99] [22.59]   [-1.26] [-5.37] [-9.31] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.1642  0.0341  0.0225    0.0208  0.1693  0.0359  
  
  [51.93] [10.72] [11.61]   [4.87] [39.85] [8.51] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.1355  0.0720  0.0320    0.0766  0.0089  0.0164  
  
  [55.52] [29.08] [22.71]   [12.39] [1.43] [2.65] 
Italy Calm 0.1366  0.0601  0.0415    0.0202  0.0111  0.0281  
  
  [36.96] [16.19] [16.46]   [3.29] [1.81] [4.57] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.1408  0.0838  0.0437    0.0387  0.0066  0.0223  
  
  [49.19] [29.13] [23.49]   [7.35] [1.25] [4.24] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.1067  0.0521  0.0190    0.0746  0.0205  0.0414  
  
  [36.89] [17.89] [11.84]   [7.53] [2.06] [4.18] 
Spain Calm 0.1159  0.0621  0.0234    0.0758  0.0021  -0.0046  
  
  [26.57] [14.03] [9.74]   [11.59] [0.33] [-0.7] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.2337  0.1363  0.0325    0.0178  -0.0197  0.0186  
  
  [79.09] [45.47] [18.09]   [3.76] [-4.16] [3.92] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.0987  0.0476  0.0132    0.0064  0.0382  0.0175  
  
  [34.07] [16.29] [9.23]   [0.91] [5.43] [2.48] 
Greece Calm 0.0788  0.0599  0.0085    0.0156  -0.0062  -0.0035  
  
  [15.47] [11.62] [3.30]   [2.78] [-1.11] [-0.62] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0816  0.0496  0.0162    -0.0167  -0.0313  0.0022  
  
  [20.93] [12.65] [8.00]   [-3.71] [-6.94] [0.49] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.1140  0.0721  0.0266    0.0651  0.0231  -0.0007  
  
  [35.82] [22.27] [13.7]   [10.35] [3.67] [-0.11] 
Ireland Calm 0.2180  -0.0202  0.0187    0.0191  0.0556  -0.0352  
  
  [41.93] [-3.77] [5.64]   [3.67] [10.72] [-6.78] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.2324  0.1002  0.0334    -0.0134  -0.0116  -0.0168  
  
  [69.53] [29.7] [13.66]   [-3.79] [-3.26] [-4.77] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.1302  0.0617  0.0249    0.1020  -0.0509  0.0683  
  
  [35.61] [16.14] [14.12]   [20.03] [-9.97] [13.34] 
Portugal Calm 0.1547  0.0599  0.0559    -0.0318  -0.0079  0.0043  
  
  [33.88] [12.99] [18.73]   [-3.97] [-0.99] [0.53] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.2015  0.1059  0.0527    -0.0256  0.0435  0.0069  
  
  [62.79] [32.72] [24.76]   [-5.87] [9.99] [1.58] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.1478  0.0553  0.0169    0.0390  0.0272  0.0701  
  
  [48.49] [17.96] [10.41]   [5.45] [3.8] [9.8] 
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Panel B: Quantities equation: returns, and intensity and returns 
    Lagged returns   Intensity and lagged returns 
    β1 β2 β3   z1 z2 z3 
Germany Calm 0.0001  0.0001  -0.0000    -0.0259  -0.0006  -0.0045  
  
  [0.34] [0.26] [-0.02]   [-11.68] [-0.28] [-2.08] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0006  0.0010  0.0001    -0.0103  -0.0000  -0.0039  
  
  [1.01] [1.62] [0.16]   [-7.74] [-0.03] [-2.93] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001    -0.0129  -0.0027  -0.0029  
  
  [-1.08] [-1.03] [-0.79]   [-20.58] [-4.25] [-4.68] 
France Calm 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000    -0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0002  
  
  [0.66] [0.37] [0.28]   [-1.83] [-0.76] [-0.68] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0001  -0.0000  -0.0000    -0.0001  -0.0000  -0.0000  
  
  [-1.3] [-0.58] [-0.05]   [-2.06] [-0.68] [-0.5] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0012  -0.0009  -0.0001    -0.0096  -0.0058  0.0025  
  
  [-4.8] [-3.31] [-0.57]   [-12.21] [-7.43] [3.23] 
Italy Calm 0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0001    -0.0001  0.0000  0.0001  
  
  [0.65] [-1.18] [-0.28]   [-0.47] [0.31] [0.9] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0001  -0.0000  -0.0001    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
  
  [-0.64] [-0.24] [-0.35]   [0.03] [0.04] [0.09] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0066  -0.0038  -0.0007    -0.0005  0.0000  -0.0007  
  
  [-6.34] [-3.62] [-0.73]   [-0.72] [0.06] [-0.97] 
Spain Calm -0.0008  -0.0034  0.0021    -0.0267  -0.0067  -0.0126  
  
  [-0.31] [-1.28] [0.81]   [-7.99] [-1.99] [-3.81] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0000  -0.0001  -0.0000    -0.0134  -0.0069  -0.0062  
  
  [-0.18] [-0.28] [-0.05]   [-5.17] [-2.66] [-2.41] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0003  -0.0002  -0.0001    -0.0003  0.0003  0.0001  
  
  [-1.98] [-1.28] [-0.99]   [-1.49] [1.48] [0.66] 
Greece Calm -0.0113  -0.0038  0.0027    -0.0202  -0.0063  -0.0008  
  
  [-3.89] [-1.3] [0.92]   [-4.81] [-1.5] [-0.19] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0001  -0.0000  0.0000    -0.0065  -0.0047  -0.0028  
  
  [-0.73] [-0.33] [0.06]   [-6.03] [-4.43] [-2.65] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0001    -0.0001  -0.0000  -0.0000  
  
  [-2.18] [-1.35] [-1.1]   [-2.93] [-0.42] [-0.16] 
Ireland Calm -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0000    -0.0612  0.0259  0.0020  
  
  [-0.21] [-0.23] [-0.01]   [-14.03] [5.93] [0.46] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0000    -0.0040  -0.0025  0.0019  
  
  [-0.73] [-0.4] [-0.3]   [-8.07] [-5.09] [3.85] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0000    -0.0005  -0.0000  -0.0002  
  
  [-1.82] [-0.67] [-1.10]   [-9.25] [-0.66] [-3.56] 
Portugal Calm -0.0008  -0.0002  -0.0001    -0.0458  0.0048  -0.0128  
  
  [-0.89] [-0.23] [-0.11]   [-7.00] [0.74] [-1.98] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0047  -0.0035  -0.0006    -0.0111  -0.0051  -0.0024  
  
  [-3.96] [-2.92] [-0.47]   [-5.87] [-2.67] [-1.26] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0000    -0.0010  -0.0003  -0.0007  
  
  [-0.69] [-0.39] [-0.13]   [-8.21] [-2.66] [-5.72] 
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Panel C: Quantities equation: intensity and trade quantity, and intercept 
    Intensity and lagged trade quantities   Intercept 
    τ1 τ2 τ3   α 
Germany Calm -0.0071  -0.0049  0.00762   -0.0006  
  
  [-6.85] [-4.67] [0.8100]   [-0.30] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis 0.0001  -0.0136  0.00449   -0.0050  
  
  [0.10] [-17.42] [0.9100]   [-4.51] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0147  -0.0171  0.03915   0.0006  
  
  [-27.35] [-31.78] [16.1900]   [1.60] 
France Calm -0.0064  -0.0102  0.0370    0.0020  
  
  [-6.42] [-10.27] [4.74]   [0.99] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0113  0.0016  -0.0083    -0.0037  
  
  [-14.12] [2.03] [-1.75]   [-2.49] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0103  -0.0093  -0.0081    -0.0003  
  
  [-17.6] [-15.80] [-1.88]   [-0.36] 
Italy Calm -0.0118  -0.0037  -0.0119    0.0253  
  
  [-7.79] [-2.47] [-1.87]   [3.62] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0123  -0.0099  0.0193    0.0060  
  
  [-11.95] [-9.65] [3.64]   [1.92] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0140  -0.0080  0.0351    -0.0081  
  
  [-13.5] [-7.68] [5.97]   [-2.31] 
Spain Calm -0.0120  -0.0057  0.0582    0.0080  
  
  [-10.06] [-4.78] [7.01]   [2.93] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0262  -0.0158  -0.0282    -0.0048  
  
  [-32.23] [-19.53] [-5.88]   [-3.17] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0088  -0.0056  -0.0021    0.0017  
  
  [-12.29] [-7.78] [-0.42]   [1.14] 
Greece Calm -0.0069  -0.0108  0.0120    0.0046  
  
  [-5.16] [-7.97] [1.35]   [1.39] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0031  -0.0023  -0.0290    -0.0015  
  
  [-2.91] [-2.13] [-5.06]   [-0.94] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0081  -0.0111  0.0320    -0.0040  
  
  [-7.79] [-10.6] [4.5]   [-3.57] 
Ireland Calm -0.0197  0.0144  0.1486    -0.0035  
  
  [-20.7] [15] [14.54]   [-2.47] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0094  -0.0032  -0.0300    -0.0036  
  
  [-12.75] [-4.4] [-9.66]   [-4.22] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis -0.0054  -0.0066  0.0104    -0.0012  
  
  [-8.54] [-9.99] [1.29]   [-2.8] 
Portugal Calm -0.0037  0.0031  -0.0400    -0.0034  
  
  [-3.01] [2.57] [-5.82]   [-0.77] 
  
Glob. fin. crisis -0.0118  -0.0070  0.0425    -0.0043  
  
  [-13.33] [-7.91] [8.47]   [-1.91] 
  
Euro sov. debt crisis 0.0027  -0.0049  0.0124    0.0037  
  
  [4.07] [-7.39] [2.88]   [3.38] 
Notes: The table displays coefficients and T-statistics for the quantities 
equation. T-statistics are shown in parentheses below the coefficient values. 
The dependent variable⁡rt = 10,000⁡ln⁡(Pt/Pt−1) is the change in the 
natural logarithm of the quoted prices;  Tt is the time interval between two 
consecutive trades in seconds; Qt is the signed trade quantity in millions; Dt is a dummy variable for the market indicator where 1 indicates a trade 
on the EuroMTS platform. Equation: Qt = α̅Q +∑ (β̅iQ +𝐾i=1z̅iQln⁡(Tt−i)) rt−i + ∑ (γ̅iQ + δ̅iQDt−i + τ̅iQln⁡(Tt−i))𝐾i=1 Qt−i + ε2,t,  lags are 
truncated at K=3 in the estimation. 
 
  
